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18 March 
1 Future Agricultures Consortium conference 
1.1 Introduction 
The Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) conference was organised by Colin Poulton 
(School of Oriental and Asian Studies, SOAS), Blessings Chinsinga (University of Malawi), 
Ian Scoones (Institute of Development Studies), Kassahun Berhanu (Addis Ababa 
University), Augustin Loada (Université de Ouagadougou) and Gaynor Paradza (PLAAS, 
University of Western Cape). 
 
The conference was co-hosted by the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) and the Institute 
for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), and took place in Pretoria, South Africa, 
from 18–20 March. Two sessions at this conference were co-organised with the IDS Rising 
Powers in International Development (RPID) programme; notes for these sessions are 
presented below. 
 
1.2 The BRICS and African agriculture 
This session brought together Arilson Favareto, Sachin Chaturvedi, Li Xiaoyun and  
Ruth Hall. 
 
 The extent to which Brazil can be presented as a model for other countries was 
questioned given its own continued problems with poverty and inequality. There 
remain, pointed out Arilson Favareto, 1.3m family farmers without a monetary 
income in Brazil. As such, there is in Brazil a conflictual relationship between big 
enterprises and family farming. Big enterprises themselves are split into agribusiness 
(high productivity, high income) and large landowners (low productivity). 
 
 The role of a strong state in Brazilian agriculture was discussed. Public policies in 
Brazil are a product of social pressures and social movements: a prominent role was 
given to extra-agricultural factors. The Brazilian experience was summarised as being 
complex and contradictory. Other countries can choose what aspects to apply and 
under what institutional conditions, rules and incentives this may be possible. 
Perhaps the most useful element of the Brazilian experience from an African 
perspective, it was suggested, would be Brazil’s ability to aid in capacity-building. 
Meanwhile, social movements in Brazil continue to try to address the negative 
aspects of Brazil agriculture. African countries could also learn from this. 
 
 What exactly do we mean when we say we are exporting a ‘model’? asked Sachin 
Chaturvedi. In the context of a renewed debate on the post-Green Revolution 
agricultural situation in India, we should be careful in how we summarise the ‘model’ 
of a diverse and changing country like India, he said. Technology transfer within the 
South, he pointed out, has the advantage of local compatibility.  
 
 India has been able to work on agricultural cooperation in Africa using the following 
modalities: the provision of policy and training support; augmenting capacity to deal 
with diseases and other challenges; providing agricultural gadgets; and providing 
lines of credit. Eritrea, Mozambique and Senegal were highlighted as India’s most 
important agricultural partners in Africa. The relationship between India and Ethiopia, 
while it may have received some negative scrutiny recently, dates back to 1953, 
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Sachin pointed out. Technical Cooperation in Developing Countries (TCDC) has 
taken priority in the Indian approach, he added. 
 
 Li Xiaoyun saw a number of agricultural implications in relation to China’s interaction 
with Africa. Figures from last year on wheat, maize and rice show that China imported 
over 50m tonnes, plus over 12m tonnes of soybean, he said, which demonstrates the 
existence of huge demand. Given China’s current over-dependence on Latin America 
and North America for agricultural imports, there is a strong opportunity for Africa to 
become an alternative source of agricultural produce. While there has been increased 
interest from China in domestic investments in African agriculture, this comes with 
clear political and economic incentives for both African states and China and cannot 
be termed ‘land grabbing’. Rather, encouraging maize and soybean production over 
Africa could have a tremendous impact on poverty reduction. On the land issue, he 
stated, the Chinese authorities are careful and fully aware that it is sensitive. 
 
 One aspect of concern from the Chinese perspective, he said, was the number of 
actors in the African agricultural field. From the Chinese perspective and experience, 
he suggested, there should really be one important actor: the state. In African states 
one can often see many plans and strategies, but these do not always get 
implemented. Learning how to make things happen on the ground is essential. 
African countries could learn a great deal from 1970s and 1980s China, the period in 
which China saw huge agricultural growth and associated poverty reduction. 
 
 Finally, Ruth Hall focused on the South African context. A lot of attention is being 
paid to the expansion of South African farmers in Africa, she said. This is better 
understood, she suggested, as expansion of agribusiness in Africa, which is a chain-
wide process. The context is the dramatic restructuring of commercial agriculture in 
South Africa since the early 1990s, which has produced winners and losers. The 
conditions for large-scale commercial farming, after over a century of state 
intervention in South Africa, no longer exist. South Africa is therefore looking at 
exporting a model without the mechanisms by which that model was created, she 
suggested.  
 
 The creation of a dualistic system of agriculture in South Africa goes back many 
decades, said Ruth. The Natives Land Act, almost 100 years ago, had prohibited 
black occupation of farmland off the ‘native reserves’. This was consolidated 
throughout the twentieth century. The majority of land was reserved for white 
commercial farming that was heavily subsidised. However, in the post-apartheid era  
a whole panoply of state subsidy was removed from agriculture in the dramatic 
neoliberal restructuring. As such, the large family farming sector has been neglected 
in the post-apartheid era. South Africa has seen the heavily dualistic growth of 
agribusiness and the growth of the marketing of packaged foods (which undercuts 
small-scale farmers). Most agricultural finance has come from the commercial sector, 
with the state playing a minor role. ‘In this context, does the BRICS represent a 
paradigm shift, or more of the same?’ she asked. 
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1.3 Brazilian and Chinese engagement in African agriculture 
This session saw the presentation of four detailed country studies from Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Ghana. These research papers were presented by Sérgio 
Chichava (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, IESE), Langton Mukwereza 
(Research for Development Trust, RDT), Ian Scoones (IDS) standing in for Dawit Alemu 
(Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research, EIAR) and Kojo Amanor (University of Ghana 
at Legon). The session was chaired by Alex Shankland (IDS). 
 
These papers are publicly available to download online: 
www.future-agricultures.org/research/cbaa/7817-china-and-brazil-in-africa-new-
papers#.Uah6Mpxc2qI  
 
Mozambique 
 Addressing Brazil and China as Mozambique’s development partners, Sérgio Chichava 
discussed Brazil’s historical affinities, common language and diplomatic bonds with 
Mozambique. In 2011, there were 21 active projects and nine new projects in 
development cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique. The main areas of 
cooperation were agriculture, education and health. Mozambique remains the top 
beneficiary of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa. It is likely to display a similar 
pattern to other countries in Africa, where the agriculture sector becomes of prime 
importance. The first landmark agreements between Mozambique and China took place 
in 2001, but the Chinese presence in Mozambique took on new impetus with the visit of 
the Chinese President in 2007. Since then, China has been among the top ten investors 
in Mozambique, and has also provided grants, technical assistance and low-interest 
loans.  
 
 While cooperation with China dates back to 1975, the present framework is based on an 
agreement signed in 2002. Mozambican actors, said Sérgio, have a tendency to 
emphasise technological drivers as the key to future development. As such, they see 
Brazil and China as important sources of capital and technology. Meanwhile, both Brazil 
and Mozambique are realising that a shared language does not equate to shared 
understanding. At the same time, China’s sustainability model – in which local partners 
must pay for Chinese local technical assistance – has been questioned, with reference 
to the types of groups within Mozambique this is likely to benefit. 
  
Zimbabwe 
 The case of Zimbabwe, as discussed by Langton Mukwereza, is different from other 
cases because in Zimbabwe, South-South Cooperation (SSC) is a necessity rather than 
a choice. The country became isolated economically and diplomatically with its 
1999/2000 land reform programme. Aid and investment flows shrank dramatically. 
Agricultural land moved into state hands and land ceased to be a form of collateral.  
A political alliance with China goes back to Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle; at 
independence, China was one of the first countries to establish relations. Zimbabwe is a 
key member of the Non-Aligned Movement. While there was historically a general 
(mis)perception that Chinese technology was inferior in Zimbabwe, it was suggested that 
this has now changed. At the height of sanctions, in 2003, Zimbabwe proclaimed its 
Look East Policy. This coincided with China’s Going Out Policy, launched some years 
earlier in 1999. China’s policy of non-interference in internal affairs and its insistence on 
stability and predictability has been beneficial for Zimbabwe. A change in perceptions 
toward China was emphasised. China is now more widely considered a sincere 
development partner by all parties in government and population at large, deepening the 
scope for SSC. 
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Ethiopia 
 The case of Ethiopia was discussed by Ian Scoones, standing in for Dawit Alemu who 
was unable to attend. Ethiopia was described as a country with ambitions, especially in 
agriculture, and high economic growth rates. It is not just a passive aid recipient, but is 
geared toward development. It is keen on SSC. Ethiopia is situated in a particular region 
with its own particular regional geopolitics. This can be effectively capitalised upon by 
the Ethiopian state. The effectiveness of the late Prime Minister Meles in this area was 
recognised. 
 
 Ethiopia remains attached to the vision of a developmental state, it was pointed out, 
which involves the experience of rapid economic growth (as in China, Brazil, Korea and 
Thailand) with the agricultural sector underpinning growth and strong state support and 
direction. Towards these ends it has introduced numerous exchanges, technical 
cooperation (with Brazil: agricultural research, bioenergy and sugar; with China: an 
agricultural technology demonstration centre, vocational training.) China and Brazil have 
also invested directly in the Ethiopian agricultural sector.  
 
 China has a number of private investments in Ethiopia – 32 since 2008. These are 
small-scale, linked to Chinese private entrepreneurs, and large-scale around state 
priorities linked to investment, encouraging vertical integration. It is not a land grab: the 
investments are geared by the Ethiopian state. Based on the East Asian experience, the 
Ethiopian approach to the agriculture sector involves strong state direction, centralised 
control, technocratic authority and political leadership. Despite aid dependence, there is 
state ‘agency’ in Ethiopia, in which the state is not simply a passive recipient of aid. 
  
Ghana 
 Kojo Amanor discussed the final country case study, Ghana. Chinese and Brazilian 
investments in Africa are shaped by a framework of SSC, he said. However, there are 
differences in the framework of SSC. Ghana was an early adopter of structural 
adjustment and it became the showcase for Western donors. The recent development of 
the oil sector has, however, brought about changes. Ghana has an open economy with 
large foreign investments in other raw materials. But there remains a difficulty for 
investors in gaining large areas of land as a result of a complex and messy tenure 
system in which chiefs wield much control over land and smallholder cultivation is highly 
developed. Despite the expansion of new horticultural crops in the 1990s and 2000s for 
the European Union (EU) market, the main agricultural export remains cocoa, with 
linkages to the three largest cocoa processors in the world. 
 
 The Ghanaian government is committed to a food value chain approach, integrating 
smallholders into agribusiness markets. There is a focus on export-oriented production. 
There has also been a decline of national agriprocessing capacity and the manufacturing 
industry since the 1970s. 
 
 Chinese investment in Ghana has historically been built on a framework of SSC which 
stresses the long history of mutually supportive relationships between Ghana and China 
and development cooperation agreements which date back to the 1960s. There is no 
evidence of attempts to promote Chinese agribusiness in Ghana. China continues to 
pursue a policy of non-interference in domestic affairs and the avoidance of policy 
conditionalities. During the 1980s the main focus of this cooperation was in rice 
irrigation, infrastructure and technical advice. Recent Chinese investments have involved 
a rapid increase of Chinese investment in Ghana. China is now Ghana’s second-largest 
trade partner, with bilateral trade reaching $2m in 2006. This trade is weighted in favour 
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of China: Ghana’s trade deficit with China is growing substantially. The key exports from 
China are manufactured products, while the main imports are raw materials. There has 
been recent Chinese interest in Ghana’s petroleum industry.  
 
 Brazil has much less of a history of being involved in development cooperation in Ghana 
but the Brazilian government has supported private sector Brazilian agribusiness in 
Ghana. In 2007, the Brazilian government announced plans to offer a loan to Northern 
Sugar Resources (a Ghana company) for a sugar cane plantation and ethanol 
processing plant in Northern Ghana, via the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), with 
ethanol designed for export to Sweden. This project has stagnated due to problems with 
land acquisition and accusations by international non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) of land grabbing. The overall Brazilian framework of SSC aims to promote the 
expansion of Brazilian agribusiness into Africa, especially as Brazil finds it increasingly 
difficult to gain access to North American markets.  
 
 During the concluding discussion, a participant described how the SSC discourse can 
tend to mask rather than explain the objectives of contemporary development 
cooperation. Furthermore, a focus on technical interventions prevents the development 
of a wider debate on ways in which SSC can lead to a qualitative transformation of 
African societies or the problems that both Brazil and China face in negotiating 
contemporary geopolitical realities. 
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19 March  
2 FIM Forum-convened civil society meeting 
2.1 Introduction 
This session brought together representatives from the following civil society organisations: 
Society for Participatory Research in Asia (PRIA) (India), Centre for Participatory Research 
(China), Articulação SUL and Centro Brasileiro de Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP) 
(Brazil), the FIM Forum for Democratic Global Governance (Canada), LogoLink and IDS. 
 
The meeting was convened by the FIM Forum in order to share experiences of civil society 
activism in the BRICS countries and at the leaders’ summits, as well as to discuss potential 
methods and means of future collaboration.  
 
2.2 Summary of discussion 
 One key discussion point focused on the question: where are we headed? If the 
Brazilian government does convene a civil society BRICS forum, how can networks and 
alliances be built to make that something real? The FIM Forum explained that, for the 
past couple of months, they have been able to organise at least one consultation in each 
country. In India and South Africa there is no ‘official’ participation in civil society 
meetings, but in most cases it had been possible to talk to the officials. It had not been 
possible to host a formal consultation in Russia, but a successful FIM Forum visit had 
taken place. 
 
 The mandate of FIM was outlined: a forum that believes in the importance of civil society 
having an impact on governance, especially global governance. It is specifically a forum, 
which means it doesn’t take positions on things in the sense that an organisation might. 
The ultimate objective is: how can we democratise global governance? Many global 
governance actors have no democratic base and are non-transparent. FIM is building 
dialogues with civil society, G8 and G20 and the BRICS. 
 
 The BRICS are going to play a key role in trying to influence global governance and, as 
such, the aim of FIM Forum was explained as bringing ‘Missing Voices’ into the 
dialogue. The leadership of such a dialogue should come from civil society in each 
BRICS country, following a launch meeting in Stockholm. 
 
 It was seen as important that this civil society dialogue does not come from the North. As 
such, it will be restricted to BRICS initially, but we have to think seriously about missing 
voices. One participant had visited Russia and returned with a highly positive impression 
of civil society in Russia and its current evolution, having observed the presence of very 
courageous and skilful organisations. It was suggested that the main concern of the 
Russian government is international NGOs coming to Russia promoting ferment against 
the current government. In China, a participant added, one has to be careful when 
talking to NGOs, as they are concerned to avoid getting into trouble. 
 
 There are common topics relating to civil society engagement – social and economic 
inequality, urbanisation, health, etc. – which could bring together civil society across the 
BRICS. It is not clear whether, at the leaders’ summit, there is an opportunity for civil 
society to be engaged. The Chinese government and officials are very careful and 
sensitive to international engagement. While the Chinese government requires high-level 
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approval to engage with external organisations, the domestic civil society is very open. 
They acknowledge the function and role of civil society in engaging with the BRICS on a 
domestic level. 
 
 There followed a wider discussion about the positioning of civil society in relation to the 
BRICS summits. There was seen to be a general lack of information in the civil society 
domain about the BRICS, with a dependence on newspapers. One suggestion involved 
thinking about a strategy to inform civil society in our respective countries. This could, for 
example, be an information hub that could link to various sources of information. 
 
 Further, some kind of dialogue or education strategy was posited: how could this be 
used to continuously inform BRICS policy officials? And, linked to the earlier point on 
identity, how could this help to establish credibility of this group working on BRICS civil 
society engagement? Who else should be included? 
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3 International development policy  
3.1 Introduction 
During the evening of 19 March, the RPID programme and the South African Institute of 
International Affairs (SAIIA) co-hosted a high-profile roundtable at SAIIA’s headquarters on 
Wits University campus in Johannesburg.  
 
This discussion brought together distinguished speakers from Brazil, China, India and South 
Africa to debate the ways in which the BRICS are changing the nature of international 
development cooperation policy. The speakers were: Paulo Esteves from the BRICS Policy 
Centre in Brazil, Silvio Caccia Bava from Instituto Pólis and Le Monde Diplomatique in 
Brazil, Kaustuv Bandyopadhyay from PRIA in India, Li Xiaoyun from China Agricultural 
University (CAU) in China, Abdullah Verachia from Frontier Advisory in South Africa, 
Neissan Alessandro Besharati from SAIIA and Richard Carey from the Rising Powers 
Advisory Council and former head of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Development Cooperation Directorate. 
 
Each speaker has been video recorded and can be watched on the IDS YouTube channel. 
This event was co-hosted by Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (SAIIA) and Lizbeth Navas-Alemán 
(IDS). 
 
3.2 Summary of discussion 
 Paulo Esteves defined ‘The BRICS effect’ as the effect of the BRICS on multilateral 
regimes. The BRICS grouping was, he pointed out, first formulated according to a 
common claim for the reform of multilateral financial institutions. In a way, this has been 
successful, as the number and inclusiveness of such forums has expanded. The BRICS 
have also been successful in undermining the claim for universality that multilateral 
regimes have made since the end of the Second World War. Historically, the South had 
been told that only path towards a prosperous world was market-oriented reform. At the 
end of the 1990s, the South learned not only that these reforms could not act as a 
saviour, but that they were severely harming the South. This experience has led to an 
anxiety for change and different models for development in those countries, he 
suggested. 
 
 In each BRICS country, noted Paulo, the state is in one way or another taking a very 
strong and important role in the development model. ‘The BRICS effect’ thus has the 
capacity to undermine the neoliberal model. The BRICS could also work as models for 
other countries, not simply on how to improve cooperation ‘effectiveness’, but also to 
explore what the main goals of development are. Unfortunately, he said, this is not 
something the OECD has taken seriously. 
 
 Brazilian South-South Cooperation (SSC) is not large in comparison to China, observed 
Paulo, and there is no specific law in Brazil relating to this area. Some problems have 
therefore emerged. Brazilian agents are starting to use the vocabulary of ownership in 
their own projects, which shows a serious distance between donor and recipient. The 
very relationship that Brazil objected to when it was an aid recipient is now starting to be 
a problem in Brazil’s own ‘cooperation’ efforts. As such, perhaps Brazil is now facing a 
serious problem of asymmetry in the field of development cooperation, which is reflected 
in the vocabulary that it is starting to use. Brazil does, however, have a strong civil 
society which can try to raise the debate inside the country and ask: does our practice of 
development cooperation help to foster rights – or the rights agenda – in our partner 
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societies? The main risk to this happening is Brazil’s paramount concern with respecting 
sovereignty in partner countries. 
 
 From PRIA, Kaustuv Bandyopadhyay spoke from the perspective of a long-term  
grass roots development actor working in India, a country which is still receiving aid as it 
also moves into providing assistance to others. The focus of Indian civil society groups 
like PRIA has primarily been at the domestic level. Rather than looking at the Indian 
government’s international policy, said Kaustuv, when looking internationally PRIA has 
focused on OECD policies and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) policies. The 
focus has been on the development cooperation framework which external actors are 
using to act in India. At times, he said, we have been disappointed and some OECD 
policy has caused irritation to us as development practitioners. Particularly 
conditionalities: the way we have been told to reform our own societies. Those policies 
have largely failed to restructure inequalities in our society relating to dalits, women and 
youth, for example. 
 
 When big-ticket infrastructure projects are discussed in the BRICS context, said 
Kaustuv, there is a worry that they may prove to be a perpetuation of the same OECD 
development policies that have been criticised in the past. Is the Indian government 
talking about community development and social development? Indian civil society 
organisations have felt encouraged on a couple of points. The Indian government has 
made clear it will not be guided by OECD-type development policies. Its primary mode of 
operation is to respond to the country which provides a request. It will not adopt a 
development aid which involves preconditions. However: will the Indian government be 
looking at how a government which provides such a request has decided its spending 
priorities? Did it undergo some kind of democratic process? We ask our government to 
be more critical, he said. For the last five decades, the North to South top-down 
approach did not nurture learning relationships. South-South Cooperation (SSC) and 
South-South Learning (SSL) must mark a departure. At least from a Civil Society 
Organisation (CSO) point of view, said Kaustuv, we have always tried to learn from 
each other and not tell each other what to do. If this is the way things go we are really 
encouraged. 
 
 Li Xiaoyun emphasised that we should not ignore the importance of intellectual 
capacity. The OECD-DAC system represents a dominant force in the international 
development arena and has constantly produced concepts which control our intellectual 
capacity: participation, gender, etc. He expressed doubt that the BRICS have a 
conceptual challenge to this. As such, the established system was seen to have 
developed a kind of industry. China was not currently seen to have a system to 
challenge this and is still not in the position to exert a great deal of intellectual influence, 
though it is becoming an influential actor, he said.  
 
 Secondly, Xiaoyun suggested that, while China would help to reshape the system of 
development cooperation, it was not likely to do so on its own. China’s development 
cooperation has been based on the Asian model – there are commonalities with Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand – and this reflects an East Asian mentality. China 
does not have the capacity to work with thousands of NGOs, so it has to work with state 
actors, and as such it assumes they are legitimate. China is, however, beginning to look 
at experiences and lessons from OECD-DAC members to ask: how can China improve 
its own programmes in terms of efficiency and effectiveness? Although China’s 
international development cooperation carries its own experiences and message, with 
an emphasis on the strong role of State and State-market-society coordination, China 
does not neglect the role of society, he said. He concluded by envisaging greater 
convergence between the approaches of China and those of the OECD-DAC. 
 
 
 
12 
 
 Abdullah Verachia discussed his work examining Chinese and Indian investment into 
Africa, asking what the developmental impact of this has been in Africa. During the 
BRICS summit in 2009, food security was mentioned. It had been very difficult to see if 
such commitments had been met, he said. During the 2011 summit, all five countries 
agreed that ‘We believe growth and development are central to addressing poverty and 
realising MDG goals’. Abdullah suggested that ‘development’ has often been a side-
issue of investment. He pointed to the infrastructure deficit in Africa (significantly 
addressed by China), and the upcoming first international visit of the new Chinese 
president to Africa in order to attend the BRICS summit. He also suggested that Indian 
history contained a number of examples for Africa. He pointed to some development 
cooperation projects, such as a pan-African India telecommunications project and the 
doubling of lines of credit towards Africa. We are seeing, he said, examples of Indian 
innovation being implemented in Africa, such as recent discussions to roll out a $35 
laptop in African countries. The BRICS Bank could make a big difference in terms of 
financing of development projects especially in Africa. Brazil, India and China want 
investment to be long-term and sustainable: corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
development must be a part of this. 
 
 Silvio Caccia Bava spoke on the need to think about how to change the way we are 
developing our world, in order to overcome accumulated social deficits. He pointed to 
Mercosur negotiations, which have involved unions and a range of civil society groups 
participating in a discussion on policies, and which now has an emerging social council 
including both government and civil society representation. This discusses how to 
balance inequalities between countries, taking into account migrant agendas, the human 
rights agenda, the right to vote, etc. There is also a Mercosur social forum, which meets 
each year in preparation for the official summit. This forum has proposed to create a 
social observatory at Mercosur to deal with international structure and voices.  
 
 Based on the experience of Mercosur, Silvio suggested that similar potential has been 
recognised in BRICS, which has an academic forum and a business forum and therefore 
could potentially accommodate a civil society forum. Such negotiations have started with 
the Brazilian government, he suggested, with a high-level meeting in November 2012 
discussing the possibility of building similar structures of citizen participation at the 
BRICS level to help create a citizen council and ensure regular participation in BRICS 
summits. It is important, he suggested, for civil society to be informed about BRICS 
discussions, with transparency being a key issue. Civil society should therefore be 
financed to acquire the capacity to formulate positions. Through networks, he said, we 
are thinking: how can we inform civil society to create conditions of legitimacy and 
support for our demands? 
 
 During the discussion, a number of points were raised, each of which was addressed by 
speakers. Paolo Esteves argued that the BRICS grouping was about offering 
alternatives to neoliberal orthodoxy. To what extent was Brazilian agricultural 
cooperation reflecting this? Actually, he suggested, it has mostly taken the form of 
triangular cooperation which is very strongly linked to a capitalist paradigm. He 
wondered, therefore, if Brazilian development cooperation was not simply a by-product 
of investment. 
 
 Responding to a question on accountability, Li Xiaoyun suggested that China would be 
willing to study South-South Cooperation and set guidelines. However, China feels weak 
in relation to the OECD-DAC, he said. China has no issue with accountability per se, but 
recognises that it is difficult to implement because of the principle of non-conditionality. 
Accountability implies conditionality and interference. 
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 Silvio Caccia Bava pointed out that the BRICS Bank will primarily be a bank, with 
governments as clients. If the government itself has accountable instruments, they can 
be used to hold it accountable. Otherwise, it seemed unlikely that the bank itself would 
have the capacity to implement such mechanisms. Responding to a question on human 
rights, Silvio stated that he was not aware of a single country that does not violate 
human rights. Talking about South-South Cooperation, he said, we are dealing with civil 
society entities in building capacity and autonomy to play a role related to governments. 
 
 Kaustuv Bandyopadhyay suggested that there is no inherent contradiction in 
promoting South-South learning and promoting non-interference. What has been the 
experience, however, is an absence of critical dialogue. He suggested that traditional 
attempts to deal with such issues through military or economic sanctions have not 
brought about real social change; as such, those instruments are not an answer. 
Learning is the basis of social change. For the World Bank, he pointed out, it took almost 
45 years to come up with an information disclosure policy.  
 
 Paulo Esteves discussed a recently-issued report from the BRICS Policy Centre, 
working with Oxfam. He suggested that the record of OECD is unimpressive over the 
last 10–20 years on inequality. Brazil was the only BRICS country in last decade that 
had actually reduced inequality (and did so with less growth). He suggested that it had 
been the neoliberal model promoted by the OECD that was responsible for the rise in 
inequality. While he was not explicitly defending the BRICS development model, he 
thought it was a positive sign that those countries were navigating through neoliberalism 
to create their own model. Responding to a question on why Brazil has not joined the 
OECD-DAC, Paulo pointed out that Brazil is not a member of the OECD and is unlikely 
therefore to accept a framework that has been developed in the OECD without Brazil’s 
participation. It’s not that Brazil has its own development cooperation model, he stated, 
but that it is offering an alternative to the neoliberal model which, ten years ago, was the 
only game in town.  
 
 Finally, Richard Carey, formerly of the OECD-DAC, addressed the audience with a brief 
presentation. He suggested that we are beginning to see a new world. Key 
developments have been the advent of G20 and the advent of the BRICS. The BRICS 
meeting in Durban next week will show that we do have this emerging world, he stated. 
To invent mechanisms for governing new world order, there needs to be something that 
evolves organically; it cannot be designed from scratch. The G20 was needed in 2009 
and so it became a leaders’ organisation. Here, the BRICS forum – with an agenda of 
working on the reform of international institutions – has assumed a much bigger role, 
with extensive work programmes and consultation processes. By 2030, two-thirds of the 
world’s investment and savings will be in today’s developing countries. This implies huge 
intermediation among developing countries, he stated, such as new financial institutions 
(such as the BRICS Bank, but also Indian and Chinese banks) and the integration of 
financial markets in various ways. We are helping to create a substructure for this new 
future, he suggested. We are likely to see a lot of convergence as these objective 
challenges in the world assert themselves. The Busan framework – the new Global 
Partnership – is part of this new, informal, international space. It’s there as a meeting 
point for everybody involved in this business, he said, where the whole model of 
ownership by developing countries of their development process has many implications. 
He concluded by recognising the advances made by Africa through such institutions as 
the African Union Commission. 
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20 March  
4 Civil society dialogue 
4.1 Introduction 
These sessions brought together participants from civil society organisations in the BRICS 
countries as well as IDS, to discuss opportunities for collaboration, participation and input 
into the BRICS Summit policy process. 
 
Participants included representatives from Articulação SUL, BRICS Policy Center, CEBRAP, 
IDS, PRIA, LogoLink, the China Centre for Participatory Research and the FIM Forum for 
Democratic Global Governance. 
 
4.2 Summary of discussion 
Session one 
 Participants discussed their experiences as civil society actors trying to influence 
multilateral organisations. Such organisations had included the G8, G20, the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference, the United Nations (UN), International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and human rights bodies such as 
the UN Human Rights Council. Surprise was expressed with regard to the rapidity with 
which the BRICS grouping had assumed mandates. There was agreement that BRICS 
looked likely to have a major impact on the contemporary world. As such, one participant 
suggested that the BRICS is no more intrinsically legitimate in a democratic sense than 
the G8 or G20, but that it can be democratised through the inclusion of structures which 
give voice and power to public and civil society opinion. The question of defining civil 
society was raised, especially with regard to including those who are not professional 
activists or NGO workers; participants also discussed methods by which civil society 
‘convenors’ can be chosen. 
 
 Latin America’s Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) was discussed as a method of state 
collaboration and integration that does not simply follow a commercial logic. The ALBA 
states have built common initiatives on health, illiteracy and social economic policy. One 
participant suggested that the BRICS is likely to represent a purely commercial mode of 
interstate collaboration unless new voices and new actors can be introduced.  
 
 The domestic agenda within the individual BRICS countries on human and social rights 
was discussed. Transparency was seen to have become a more important topic in 
China, with the recent introduction of laws on public access to government information, 
and stipulating government departments are now to disclose expenditure and budget 
details in some areas. This was seen as an encouraging early step. It was pointed out 
that the term ‘human rights’ is less used in China than other terms, including ‘livelihood’ 
and ‘wellbeing’, though the concepts expressed are not unlike. The Chinese government 
was also seen to have made a number of achievements since the early 2000s on 
inequality, human rights issues, climate change and the environment. The Chinese 
central government has been financing local NGOs and providing buildings, capacity 
training and experts. This may have opened up space for mutual learning between 
China and the other BRICS countries, especially Brazil, on civil society engagement, it 
was suggested. Russia has a deep history of civil society, said another participant, as 
does China. We should therefore drop the assumption that civil society is ‘weak’ in these 
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countries; it is actually powerful, though may express itself differently as compared to 
other countries. 
 
 The idea of a transnational network of BRICS civil society groups was discussed. One 
participant suggested that this could operate on three levels: (1) to engage primarily with 
the comparative perspective; to build, in other words, South-South Cooperation amongst 
civil society groups; (2) to focus on the ‘footprint’ abroad of one’s own state; and (3) to 
try to influence the BRICS as a grouping. Another participant suggested a further 
category, in which NGOs remain rooted in their domestic context but also begin to 
engage transnationally in a variety of forms.  
 
 Participants discussed the broader global context. It was suggested that the current 
global crisis is characterised by the emergence of participatory democracy and its 
conflict with representative democracy, a conflict most prominent in liberal democratic 
countries. Obtaining ‘credibility’ as civil society organisations was discussed in this 
context; credibility was seen as emerging from knowledge, a track record, creativity, 
passion and values. There will be many levels of efforts to influence BRICS and 
multilateral policies, stated one discussant – from rage on the streets to ‘quiet diplomacy’ 
behind closed doors. Discussions of tactics could therefore only be presented as one 
option among many. The dangers of civil society co-option and conciliation by 
governments was discussed, with an example given of the World Bank’s approach to 
criticism. It was seen as being vitally important that civil society groups take the initiative 
and set the agenda. One participant questioned how and in relation to whom ‘credibility’ 
was defined. 
 
 There are, one participant suggested, two important dimensions of representation. The 
first is on the question of whom the BRICS as individual states represent, which can be 
problematic or contested, such as the idea of South Africa representing Africa or Brazil 
representing Latin America. Second was the issue of broader BRICS ideological 
representation (for example, relating to the Non-Aligned Movement). Here the issue of 
national sovereignty and non-interference has become prominent. ‘How do you really 
democratise the BRICS as a formation?’ asked another participant. As a principle, it was 
suggested, different stakeholders should be engaged. It was pointed out that the 
potential impact of the BRICS Development Bank could be to make less clear the lines 
of lobbying, which have traditionally been along sectoral lines.   
 
 Strategic engagement with academia was discussed. This was seen to include both the 
varying types of academia that exist within the BRICS countries and academia outside 
the BRICS. The various possible roles of academia from a civil society perspective were 
discussed, as was the legitimacy of such engagement. The traditional academic roles of 
framing and developing intellectual constructs was seen as potentially both problematic 
and useful. Academic networks, it was suggested, might be used to create space and 
legitimise positions and experience. One discussant expressed disappointment with his 
engagement with the academic community, in which knowledge was seen to have 
treated ‘almost as a commodity’. The growing trend for, and emphasis on, Open Access 
research materials was mentioned.  
 
 Modes of civil society engagement with governments in the BRICS countries were 
discussed extensively. Participants tended to agree that Ministries of External/Foreign 
Affairs were less aware of the role of civil society in policymaking than other 
departments. Issues of social policy, health, education and agriculture had long been 
influenced by civil society, pointed out one participant, giving the example of India, 
where a national education policy was built using civil society innovation. It was thought 
to be desirable to make an effort at the civil society level to document civil society 
contributions to social policies. ‘We need to systematise experience and communicate 
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innovations,’ added one participant. It was suggested that this might have strategic and 
tactical value in increasing the ‘credibility’ of civil society participation.  
 
 Civil society can be, suggested one participant, its own worst enemy in terms of 
communicating what it does, especially in terms of objectifying the quality and 
uniqueness of its work; academics might be able to help here as they possess the 
methodological background and support. Another participant emphasised the need to be 
proactive in presenting and introducing civil society work to the respective governments 
abroad, to demonstrate that ‘we are here’. 
 
Session two 
 The 6th BRICS Summit scheduled to take place in Brazil in 2014 was discussed. It was 
thought that an open social forum was necessary, close to but before the official 
meeting, which might be discussed between the BRICS countries. The need was 
expressed to ask for representation in the official delegation and ask for a social council 
on the BRICS. In parallel, it was thought that an interchange of information might be 
established in the context of building an agenda to present at the official meeting. A 
Brazilian colleague stated that these issues were being discussed in Brazil and that the 
Brazilian government seemed to be open to such proposals. There was said to be a 
better-than-expected response from the Chinese government to discussion of civil 
society involvement in the BRICS. It is unusual for domestic Chinese civil society to be 
engaged in global issues, stated a participant, so such organisations may not be clear 
on the way ahead. There was discussion of the permanent institutionalisation of a 
BRICS Social Council, an idea that had been met with some official resistance due to 
the fact of the BRICS initiative having remained relatively informal, with therefore less 
prospect for institutionalising social participation. The agenda for the 2014 Summit, it 
was thought, would be set up perhaps two months before the Summit itself; as such civil 
society needed to accumulate knowledge to participate in this process. 
 
 Specific perspectives from India were voiced. Civil society consultations had taken place 
before the Fourth BRICS Summit in Delhi. Since then, there had been some one-to-one 
dialogue with officials who have a BRICS remit. There is, a participant suggested, a 
general consensus amongst Indian civil society that it was important to engage with the 
BRICS process and understand it better. One argument supported by most had been to 
broaden the BRICS entity to include civil society. While an emphasis on South-South 
learning was appreciated, activists were cautious that this may represent positive 
rhetoric but not action. One dilemma presented itself in the shape of huge poverty and 
inequality in Indian society, which has increased tension between civil society and the 
Indian government because the Indian growth model was seen, from the government 
perspective, as something that cannot be challenged. There was therefore a dilemma for 
civil society, said the participant, about where to allocate resources – whether to 
continue to focus on India’s major domestic problems, or try to extend capacity to deal 
also with Indian engagement in the BRICS. The Indian government was keen to avoid a 
negative image of India being created abroad; they needed to be convinced that civil 
society groups wanted to engage and not only protest. A desire to capitalise on 
connections between civil society in other BRICS countries was expressed, perhaps in 
the form of a BRICS civil society network.  
 
 Perspectives from Russia were voiced. There had been recent regulations imposed on 
Russian civil society organisations; such regulations were linked to broader Russian 
government’s concerns regarding the foreign funding of domestic organisations. 
However, this had been challenged by domestic civil society groups who continued to 
engage in a dialogue with the government. There is, a participant suggested, a 
sophisticated level of dialogue between civil society and the government in Russia, as 
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well as with multilateral organisations that the Russian government is engaged in, such 
as the BRICS. The Russia government is, however, explicit that they do not desire 
Western interventions in Russian affairs. Another participant spoke about Russia as 
having remained a relatively conservative country in terms of its approach to 
international politics, giving as an example Russian opposition to intervention abroad. 
Russia had become a donor country again, the participant pointed out, but such aid was 
not being spent on internationalising domestic NGOs. It was, rather, focused on 
multilateral institutions and debt relief. 
 
 South African participants expressed their views. There was a feeling of caution; existing 
forums were perhaps not broad enough to engage. There is a need to broaden dialogue, 
review mechanisms and review the capacity for civil society engagement, said a 
participant. The IDS State of the Debate paper on South Africa’s engagements abroad – 
which is emerging over the next year – will be, it was thought, important in helping to 
engage with this question from civil society on whether to engage and to ask questions 
on whether there is a role for civil society in South Africa to monitor the government’s 
foreign policy agenda and to hold the South African private sector to account. There was 
a discussion about the South African government’s ‘BRICS roadshows’, which were not 
generally seen as civil society interactions, but rather as exercises in top-down 
communication. One participant pointed to an independent meeting of labour unions, 
and asked why, since there is a BRICS business council, the unions had been left out. 
The participant welcomed the self-organisation methods of the unions.  
 
 The global context was once again discussed, this time in relation to the opportunities 
that present themselves for working on governance. The IBSA (India, Brazil, South 
Africa) group was pointed to as a multi-ethnic coalition of democracies with a natural 
affinity with one another, a common struggle against oppression, shared constitutional 
values and large diasporas. By contrast, asked a participant, what are the BRICS? It 
was suggested that business is bringing these governments together and shaping the 
agenda; this presents a challenge for civil society. The conditions of civil society are 
different, suggested a participant, in IBSA compared to Russia and China. IBSA may be 
able to influence its non-democratic BRICS partners, it was suggested. The question 
was raised: should we engage with the G8 and G20? These are illegitimate bodies 
outside the UN, it was suggested, lacking accountability to the international community. 
We nevertheless have to engage, suggested another participant. Will the BRICS 
countries ensure that civil society is recognised as a set of independent actors in their 
own right when giving funds to other countries? The BRICS countries’ position as 
powerful and as bulwarks against Western hegemony was discussed, with a link to the 
Syrian crisis. Since the BRICS is here to stay, it was suggested, there is a need to be 
both inside and outside to ensure that a rights-based approach remains central to the 
BRICS.  
 
 Transnational networking within IBSA was discussed; the BRICS was seen as perhaps 
being more strategically important. While the BRICS is still emerging and evolving, IBSA 
is apparently already institutionalised. One participant suggested that the more 
progressive of IBSA governments had been able to encourage their allies to take a more 
progressive direction. The ‘BRICS from Below’ events were discussed: these had aimed 
to bring critical voices to the debate, with a week of events in parallel, including field 
visits to Durban. Civil society must have a role in scrutinising what is going on, said a 
participant. The BRICS Bank initiative was pointed to as example of an area in which 
civil society activists needed to identify existing best accountability practices and not to 
reinvent the wheel. The sharing of experience and knowledge was seen to be important. 
There was also a need to create a network to monitor the new bank, said a participant. 
Political interests behind the creation of the BRICS Bank were discussed. What did the 
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concept of ‘middle powers’ mean? If some of BRICS could be classified as ‘middle 
powers’, what kind of social values were they exporting?  
 
 One participant described the BRICS as ‘fragmented, multi-class states’ that are 
fractured in more ways than ‘middle powers’ have traditionally been. As such, the 
attempt by these countries to play ‘middle power’ roles was seen to be part of a strategy 
to create a possible strategic ambiguity that the countries can utilise to project 
themselves and try to converge divergent interest groups, The example of Lula’s 
announcement of initiatives into Africa was mentioned by the participants, a statement 
which played to audiences including both the Brazilian business sector and the Brazilian 
political left. The findings of a poll asking South Africans about international engagement 
were outlined and discussed.  
 
 There existed friendship between the people of BRICS countries, suggested one 
participant, and this allowed space for civil society, students, the media, and academia 
to build inter-BRICS relations. It was thought that this could lead to the sharing of best 
practice on good governance and democracy-building. We cannot evaluate the BRICS, 
a participant said, without considering hegemony and our present capitalist crisis. It 
seems that the evaluation is that BRICS countries are trying to get into the club and to 
be recognised as a peer by the global powers, suggested the participant. The proposed 
free trade agreement between the EU and US was mentioned in this context. It was 
thought that the implementation of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 
strategy of economic growth might be complementary in legitimising government and 
creating the conditions to implement the current logic of capitalism. The infrastructure 
plan for Mercosur in Latin America – which aims to integrate commerce, open up ports, 
communications, energy and roads – was mentioned as a relevant comparison. The key 
global crises were discussed: global warming, hunger, inequality, deep political 
instability; the necessary steps forward were also mentioned, including redistribution of 
wealth, the regulation of the global financial system, the end of tax havens, and so on. 
We may find ourselves caught, suggested one participant, between a macro-scale 
impasse and the desire for action. There was a suggestion that each participant would 
take the time, following the meeting, to reflect in their own networks about where the 
centre of gravity lies for constructing the agenda in these spaces.  
 
 Civil society systems are full of energy and creativity, said a participant. We cannot wait 
for change from above. The most impressive changes in global governance have been 
initiated and steered by civil society, the participant suggested, giving the example of an 
international criminal court and landmines. There thus remains a common interest in 
reforming the global governance power. This pattern should continue, suggested 
another participant. An information hub was suggested as being needed. There may be 
conflict in dialogue but this can be constructive, it was suggested, and open to 
conversations with the academic community. It may require their assistance to articulate 
positions on the BRICS projects. 
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5 Advisory Council meeting 
5.1 Introduction 
This discussion, the notes of which have been produced as a separate document, was held 
on 20 March 2013 between five members of the Advisory Council of the IDS Rising Powers 
in International Development (RPID) programme and three IDS RPID staff members. (See 
list of participants in Appendix.)  
 
The discussion was held on Wits University campus in Johannesburg with five people 
present; a further three participated by phone. The aim was to report back to the Advisory 
Council on developments in the RPID programme since a week of events had been initiated 
in Johannesburg immediately preceding the BRICS Summit 2013. 
 
5.2 Agenda 
The following agenda items were discussed: 
  
 BRICS civil society/academic forum updates 
 South Africa events updates 
 Areas for Advisory Council focus 
 The BRICS and agriculture in Africa 
 A new Chinese development policy network 
 
See separate document for an account of this meeting (‘Policy Network Agenda 
Johannesburg, 20 March 2013: IDS Rising Powers in International Development Advisory 
Council Discussion’). 
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6 Business interviews 
6.1 Summary 
Dr Lizbeth Navas-Alemán conducted a number of interviews with key informants in the South 
African business sector, with the aim of gathering background material for the ‘Business from 
the BRICS’ cross-cutting study. 
 
Interviewees were based at a number of institutions, including the Gordon Institute of 
Business Science, International Trade Projects, St Augustine College of South Africa, 
Gauteng Growth and Development Agency, National Business Institute, Centre for Chinese 
Studies, University of Stellenbosch, Frontier Advisory, Wits Business School and Whitehouse 
& Associates. 
 
A range of topics were discussed in the business interviews, including: 
 
 The current state of South Africa’s business sector. 
 Likely prospects for South Africa’s business sector in the context of the BRICS group. 
 Topics likely to be discussed at the BRICS Business Forum. 
 South African business as a development actor in other African countries; relations 
between the South African private sector and the South African government and 
diplomatic representation. 
 Relationships between South African businesses and those from other BRICS countries, 
particularly on the ground in low-income countries in Africa. 
 Possible outcomes and impacts of the BRICS Development Bank. 
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21 March  
7 Lessons learned from State of the Debate 
studies 
7.1 Introduction 
This session brought together a group of people involved in the State of the Debate country 
studies with the purpose of discussing progress on these studies and developing a common 
framework for going forward. 
 
 One key discussion point was the need to make a decision on synthesising the State of 
the Debate studies. Will this be a book, journal, even a video? The group was open to 
ideas as long as the result reflects a common product.  
 
 Those involved in the Brazil study reported back on their work, which was almost 
completed. There were a number of key findings relating to ideas and identity, including 
the importance of Brazil’s self-image (its ‘destiny’ to play a greater role in international 
affairs, etc.), the fact that it is – and sees itself – as an emerging power and an 
intermediary between the North and South. This was seen to interact with Brazil’s 
traditional foreign policy principles: a Southern identity, non-intervention, autonomy, 
pragmatism, pacifism, and universalism. There was a strong element of the repudiation 
of coercion, with cooperation as a bulwark for Brazil’s international engagement. 
Brazilian development cooperation was discussed as a soft power instrument, with its 
own particularities. 
 
 Brazil is a provider of bilateral, regional, trilateral and multilateral aid in the form of 
international development cooperation. This is achieved through a number of modalities, 
including technical cooperation, financial cooperation, educational cooperation, 
humanitarian assistance and support to refugees. Brazil does not have a comprehensive 
South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) policy, however, and such initiatives are 
fragmented. The magnitude of Brazilian cooperation, its distinctive features and its key 
nodes of activity are thus still largely unknown and under-represented in public debates. 
 
 There remains no legal framework for Brazilian international cooperation. The Brazilian 
Cooperation Agency (ABC) depends on the external relations ministry and is 
operationalised through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). There is a 
high turnover of public staff. ABC is actually just a small player in the picture of Brazilian 
cooperation. A number of interesting arguments had been raised during focus groups 
held in Brazil. The official discourse on SSDC was discussed with reference to its 
ostensibly demand-driven nature, policy diffusion, the nature of solidarity and mutual 
benefits, Brazil’s presence in South America as opposed to in Africa, and so on.  
 
 The domestic academic debate on Brazilian SSDC was seen to be expanding, though it 
was still represented by a normative approach rather than technical or evidence-based 
studies and field work. There is a lack of analysis on policymaking, it was pointed out, 
and the key scholarly field represented is International Relations with some critical 
anthropologist scholars. Finally, the important role of civil society as a key actor in 
Brazil’s social development and an experienced player in international development 
cooperation was discussed. Civil society is keen to avoid the ‘depoliticisation’ or 
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‘technification’ of political processes. A short presentation was made on the 
representation of development cooperation in the Brazilian media.  
 
 A discussion of the role of Brazilian business in SSDC followed, with the presentation of 
views from (mainly government) organisations which work with business and also 
directly from large- and medium-sized firms that operate in Africa. The general view was 
one of decreasing Brazilian engagement with Africa and a slow disengagement with the 
continent, particularly evident in the case of Angola and Mozambique. From the Ministry 
of Commerce, the line is not that this has been reduced but that it is being refined. 
Private firms which had been interviewed included those working in the mining, oil and 
gas, construction and agriculture sectors. Regardless of motive, there is an investment 
in skilled labour in Africa. There were mixed and more limited views, however, when it 
came to direct involvement in social programmes. 
 
 There was a discussion on the extent to which this can change depending on the size of 
an investment. There is a sense from South African companies, one participant 
suggested, that South African embassies are not really geared towards providing 
support. South African companies investing in Nigeria are recognising the importance of 
sound intergovernmental relations on investment on the ground. Such companies say 
that the Brazilian engine of modality is the closest to their own: both are commercially 
driven and not primarily interested in humanitarian objectives. 
 
 A presentation was given on the Russian State of the Debate report. Russia is one of the 
less organised of the BRICS donors in terms of building-up bilateral aid programmes, 
explained a participant, and it is building upon a legacy which is quite interesting. The 
focus of Soviet foreign assistance was to establish economic cooperation agreements 
with developing countries around the world, particularly those susceptible to the Soviet 
sphere of influence. It focused on three main groups: (i) COMECON, (Eastern Bloc, 
Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia), (ii) more socialist-oriented countries, and (iii) strategically 
located non-socialist countries. Economic cooperation was designed to peacefully 
transfer these developing countries into a socialist world and pull developing countries 
away from the West/capitalist world.  
 
 What does this mean for Russia today? To what extent are Russia/the BRICS seeking 
cooperation with developing countries to challenge the domination of other powers? 
Would the same geographical areas be targeted? These are questions being looked at 
in the Russia study. There is a stark absence of institutional memory in Russia, linked to 
the lack of an infrastructural establishment on development cooperation. It wasn’t until 
Russia hosted the G8 in 2005 that this issue came back to the fore. In surveys of elites 
and opinion leaders, the allocation of aid through international organisations had been 
considered preferable due to corruption concerns in Russia. The health sector had also 
been considered preferable because of Russian experience in this area. 
 
 The Russian Ministry of Finance has proposed a Russian agency for international 
development, which would be responsible for bilateral assistance. However, there is 
uncertainly, lack of knowledge and pseudo-competition. The Ministry of Economic 
Development, a third actor, was pinpointed last summer as the place for bilateral 
assistance; it was therefore the host of the ‘BRICS in Africa’ meeting. It is possible that 
when Russia hosts the G8, it will provide more evidence of how it plans to respond to 
influence from other G8 countries. In the Gorbachev years, the Russians approached 
the DAC and were excited to get involved in aid coordination. 
 
 Foreign policy remains very elite-driven, it was pointed out. As such, research in this 
area still involves asking people who don’t normally speak about their jobs to conduct 
candid interviews. Much Official Development Assistance (ODA) or development 
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cooperation in the BRICS context is very specialised, such as South Africa’s mediation 
policy in Africa. As such there may be very little convergence, because of the differing 
expectations of different constituencies: the policy community, business and civil society.  
 
 The broader question, focusing on what the State of the Debate studies are good for, 
was addressed. The answer is likely to be specific to each context. What can we do 
across the contexts that could take us further? The link between content and process will 
vary with each country’s reality. We are trying to find a reasonably standard 
methodology that permits a common framing. The idea is to create a space in which 
government agencies can encounter one another without the expectation of a formal 
commitment. This is valuable in itself. What is the added value of joint ownership, 
between institutions, both within the same country and internationally? The initial framing 
was that it would be a joint report led by country partner, then a country policy brief and 
an IDS policy briefing that incorporates contributions, but for which IDS takes 
responsibility.  
 
 In Brazil and other Southern countries, suggested one participant, foreign policy is not 
widely debated. As such, the project may appear elite-driven, in the sense that 
researchers are not talking about grass roots projects unless they have an international 
component or something to say about Brazil’s ‘footprint’ abroad. Only members of the 
Brazilian government who are involved in Brazilian development cooperation are being 
consulted. As such, the participant highlighted, ‘public perception’ does not mean 
representativeness. This must be clear. 
 
 The broader purpose of these reports was discussed. We need, it was suggested, to 
create spaces of confidence between actors: government, business, civil society, etc. In 
the same line of argument, it would be important to give feedback of the whole report to 
all actors. It’s very important to create this space of confidence because of transparency. 
A joint publication, one participant from Brazil stated, would be a really nice result. This 
would be a good product to generate debate on BRICS engagement, and it would 
legitimate our own State of the Debate process. 
 
 The most valuable thing about this study, a participant suggested, is its comparative 
element. Policy briefings which point to conceptual issues and implications for 
policymaking around being effective actors in this field are enormously valuable. We are 
also trying to understand how individual countries are positioning themselves to be 
effective players in development cooperation. As such, perhaps a series of comparative 
policy briefings looking at different country experiences would be very interesting. And 
then, of course, there is always a book.  
 
 The conversation closed with a comment about the richness of what had been 
discussed. Other people are likely to find this conversation useful for their own work. For 
the final synthesis project, one participant suggested, it would be good if the authorship 
could lean towards the BRICS and not towards the Global North.  
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International development policy roundtable panellists 
 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos 
South African Institute of International Affairs 
(SAIIA) 
Lizbeth Navas-Alemán 
Institute of Development Studies 
(IDS) 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos has headed the South 
African Institute of International Affairs since 
2005. Before her current appointment she was 
Director of Studies at SAIIA from 1999 to April 
2005. She was previously Research Director at 
the South African Institute of Race Relations and 
editor of the highly acclaimed Race Relations 
Survey (now the South Africa Survey), an annual 
publication documenting political and 
constitutional developments, and socioeconomic 
disparities in South Africa.  
 
She is the Editor-in-Chief of the South African 
Journal of International Affairs. She serves on the 
Scientific Advisory Board of the EU’s 
Development Commissioner and is a member of 
the International Advisory Board of the Indian 
Foreign Affairs Journal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Lizbeth Navas-Alemán is a socioeconomist 
with extensive experience in the field of 
international development.  
 
She is the Co-Convenor of the new IDS Rising 
Powers research programme, formerly the IDS 
BRICS Initiative. Dr Navas-Alemán carries out 
academic research, training and consultancy on 
private sector development, industrial 
organisation and innovation in Latin America, 
Asia and Europe.  
 
Dr Navas-Alemán’s academic contributions 
involved advancing measurement tools for 
governance and upgrading attainment of 
developing country firms and clusters operating in 
global and national value chains; highlighting the 
role of domestic markets in the acquisition of 
higher value-added capabilities (marketing and 
branding); proposing ‘multi-chain’ strategies for 
increased competitiveness and analysing ways to 
enhance the impact of donor-led value chain 
programmes on poverty alleviation.  
 
Dr Navas-Alemán is currently undertaking 
research on the financial and innovation 
processes needed to upgrade developing 
countries’ position in value chains. These projects 
focus on light manufacturing in China as well as 
natural resource-based and IT industries in Latin 
America. She is the Co-Convenor of the MA 
Development Studies programme at IDS.  
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Neissan Besharati 
University of the Witwatersrand, Graduate School 
of Public and Development Management (PDM) 
Kaustuv Bandyopadhyay 
Society for Participatory Research in Asia 
(PRIA) 
 
 
 
Neissan Alessandro Besharati is a Research 
Fellow at the South African Institute of 
International Affairs, the Social Science Research 
Council and the University of Witwatersrand 
Graduate School of Public and Development 
Management, where he also lectures.  
 
He also works as a consultant and policy advisor 
to different departments of the Government of 
South Africa, international development agencies 
and global thinktanks. His areas of expertise 
include international cooperation, development 
policy, and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kaustuv Bandyopadhyay is Director of Global 
Partnerships at PRIA and a member of the 
Strategic Management Board of PRIA. His current 
responsibilities include strategic planning, 
programme development, networking and 
partnership building, and resource mobilisation. 
 
He provides research, consultancy and training 
services in the areas of democratic governance, 
citizenship and civil society building (including 
organisation development, strategic planning, 
participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation) 
and social accountability. 
 
From 1998–2008, he was the Head of the Urban 
Governance Programme at PRIA, working on 
research, training and programme development in 
the areas of citizen participation, social 
accountability and participatory urban 
governance.  
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Silvio Caccia Bava 
Instituto Polis, Le Monde Diplomatique 
Paulo Esteves 
BRICS Policy Center (Brazil) 
 
 
 
Silvio Caccia Bava is a Sociologist, Researcher at 
the Instituto Polis, Director and Editor-in-Chief of 
Le Monde Diplomatique Brazil. He coordinates 
the global network LogoLink , the Learning 
Initiative on Citizen Participation and Local 
Governance. 
 
He was President of the Brazilian Association of 
NGOs – ABONG – for two terms and President of 
the Latin American Association of Organizations 
for the Promotion of Development (ALOP). He 
was also a member of the Brazilian 
National Council for Food and Nutritional Security 
(CONSEA), Vice President of the Human Rights 
State Council in the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil; 
and Latin America Director for the Habitat 
International Coalition.  
 
He has published extensively on topics such as 
social movements, citizen participation, local 
development, the systemic crisis and new 
paradigms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paulo Luiz Moreaux Lavigne Esteves holds a 
degree in History from the Universidade Federal 
de Minas Gerais (1993), and an MSc (1995) and 
PhD (2003) in Political Science at Instituto 
Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro 
(IUPERJ). He is Professor of International 
Relations at the Catholic University of Rio de 
Janeiro and was the editor of the books 
Instituições Internacionais: Segurança, Comércio 
e Integração (2004) and Relações Internacionais: 
Debates Teóricos e Metateóricos (2010).  
 
He has experience as a consultant to the United 
Nations Development Program, the Government 
of the State of Minas Gerais, CNPq (Brazil’s 
National Council of Technological and Scientific 
Development, linked to the Ministry of Science 
and Technology) and CAPES (Higher Education 
Co-ordination Agency, linked to the Ministry of 
Education). He was a founding member of the 
Association of International Relations, of which he 
was Director from 2005 to 2009, and is an elected 
member of the executive committee International 
Political Sociology, a branch of the International 
Studies Association.  
 
He is currently conducting research on the 
convergence of the fields of international security, 
humanitarian assistance and development and on 
the participation of Brazil, middle powers, and 
peripheral countries in the new international 
security architecture. 
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Li Xiaoyun 
China Agricultural University 
Richard Carey 
International Development Consultant, Former 
director of the OECD-DAC 
 
 
 
Professor Li Xiaoyun is the Dean of the College of 
Humanities and Development, China Agricultural 
University, Beijing; and the Vice President of 
China Rural Sociology Association. He is also 
Executive Member of the China Rural Economics 
Association, a scientific advisor to the State 
Council leading Group for Poverty Reduction and 
Development and Member of the Advisory Group 
for the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) and Department for International 
Development (DFID) joint programme in China; 
and Director of the China-DAC Study Group.  
 
Professor Li is a prominent participant in several 
internationally aided development initiatives in 
China. Before his academic career he was a 
Research Officer in the State Council’s Research 
Centre for Development, immediately after 
finishing his Beijing Agricultural University PhD in 
1987.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Richard Carey is an independent consultant 
working in international development. He is the 
former Director for the Development Co-operation 
Directorate (DAC) of the OECD and Co-Chair of 
the China DAC study group. Prior to joining the 
OECD-DAC in 1980, Mr Carey worked in a range 
of economic policy positions with the New 
Zealand Treasury; and as Deputy Permanent 
Representative in the New Zealand Delegation to 
the OECD.  
 
As Deputy Director of the Development 
Cooperation Directorate (DCD), he led the 
analytical work for the North-South Group during 
its existence from 1980–9 which culminated in a 
report forming the basis for the OECD Council’s 
decision to begin dialogue with the major 
developments in the DAC’s work, such as 
evolution of the peer-review system and several 
subsidiary body functions, including governance 
and capacity development. He acted as Secretary 
to the high-level Groupe de Réflexion which 
produced an influential report setting out the 
concept of the development goals, developing 
country-led partnerships and policy coherence, 
leading to the UN MDGs and to the Paris 
Declaration on aid effectiveness.  
 
From the late 1990s, Mr Carey led the DAC’s 
work on trade capacity-building, aid for trade, and 
cooperation with the WTO. He was also closely 
involved in the OECD’s relationship with Africa, 
including the establishment of the Africa 
Partnership Forum Support Unit.  
 
Born in New Zealand, Mr Carey has a BA in 
Economics and Political Science from Victoria 
University of Wellington, and an MSc in 
Economics from the London School of 
Economics. 
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Alex Shankland 
Institute of Development Studies  
(IDS) 
 
Abdullah Verachia 
Co-Founder and Partner at Frontier Advisory, 
Faculty Member at the Gordon Institute of 
Business Science (GIBS) 
 
 
 
Alex Shankland is a social scientist with over two 
decades’ experience of working in Brazil, Peru, 
Angola and Mozambique as a researcher, NGO 
manager and social development consultant. He 
has researched, taught and published extensively 
on rights, participation and policy, particularly in 
the health sector, and his doctoral thesis was on 
representation and health policy in the Brazilian 
Amazon.  
 
Current research interests centre on theories and 
practices of democratic representation and 
citizen-state engagement, with particular 
reference to the political strategies of indigenous 
peoples and other marginalised minorities 
engaging with development and climate change 
policies. Having joined the Power, Participation 
and Social Change Team as a Fellow in 2010, 
Alex currently convenes the team’s ‘Unruly 
Politics’ research programme and is engaged in 
ongoing research on citizen action, local 
governance, health system reform and the 
political economy of climate change in Brazil, 
Mozambique and Angola.  
 
As Co-Convenor of the new Rising Powers 
research programme (formerly the ‘IDS BRICS 
Initiative’) his research focuses on the role of 
Brazil and other emerging powers in reshaping 
international development. Prior to 2010 Alex was 
Research Manager for the Development 
Research Centre on Citizenship, Participation and 
Accountability.  
 
Recent projects: ‘Understanding the Political 
Economy of Low Carbon and Climate-Resilient 
Development’; ‘Future Health Systems 
Consortium’; ‘Learning Hub’; and ‘Brazil 
Indigenous Health System’.  
 
 
 
 
 
Abdullah Verachia is the Co-Founder and a 
Partner at a leading international management 
consulting firm, Frontier Advisory. As a 
management consultant involved in capital 
advisory, strategy and research in emerging 
markets, he has advised and crafted strategies 
for leading companies globally. He is a faculty 
member at a leading business school specialising 
in frontier and emerging markets. 
 
He has presented in over 60 cities globally, to 
leading listed firms, international organisations 
and governments including in Beijing, Shenzen, 
Shanghai, Mumbai, Bangalore, Delhi, Singapore, 
Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, Frankfurt, Munich, 
Copenhagen, Madrid, Paris, London and New 
York.  
 
He has been asked to present at some of the 
world’s leading institutions including the School of 
Public and International Affairs at Colombia 
University in New York, the Said Business School 
at Oxford University, the OECD in Paris and Casa 
Asia in Madrid amongst others. 
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Civil society events panellists 
 
Hayley MacGregor 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
Marc Berenson 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
 
 
 
Originally trained as a medical doctor in South 
Africa, Hayley MacGregor pursued further studies 
in Social Anthropology, completing a PhD at the 
University of Cambridge in 2003. This doctoral 
research pursued an interest in medical 
anthropology, in particular mental illness and 
mental health service provisioning in post-conflict 
and low-income settings. A subsequent period at 
the Human Sciences Research Council of South 
Africa broadened her work to address changes in 
social security provisioning in the event of illness, 
and the politics of ‘disability’.  
 
Current research interests include the dynamics 
of poverty and illness/disability, human rights 
discourses and citizen mobilisation in the context 
of health provisioning, and the ethnography of 
biomedical research and health technologies. Her 
research to-date has been situated in Africa. 
Parallel to these anthropological concerns, she 
retains an interest in clinical psychiatric practice. 
 
Selected projects and recent work: Social, 
Technological and Environmental Pathways to 
Sustainability (STEPS) Centre; Aid for AIDS: How 
do community groups negotiate the new financial 
architecture? 
 
Thematic expertise: anthropology; health; HIV / 
AIDS; science and society. 
 
Geographic expertise: sub-Saharan Africa; China. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Marc P. Berenson received his PhD in Political 
Science from Princeton University in 2006. His 
work focuses on public policy in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, with particular 
attention to the comparative analysis of post-
communist governing institutions. He has worked 
as a research analyst for several organisations, 
including the American Bar Association, the 
EastWest Institute, the Carter Centre and the 
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project at 
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. After 
receiving his BA from Harvard University, he 
founded and directed from 1996 to 1998 the ‘Law 
in Action’ programme for Freedom House in Kyiv, 
Ukraine. A recipient of over a dozen academic 
grants and fellowships, Marc is fluent in Russian 
and Polish and has a reading knowledge of 
Ukrainian. 
 
Selected projects and recent work include: 
Academic Partnership in Support of Teaching 
Development Aid Curriculum in Russia; Re-
creating the State: Governance, Civil Society and 
Trust in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. 
 
Thematic expertise: governance; state capacity; 
taxation; politics and power. 
 
Geographic expertise: Russia and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States; Poland; 
Russian Federation; Ukraine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Jennifer Constantine 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
Stacey Townsend 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
 
 
 
 
Jennifer Constantine is a Research Consultant 
working on the IDS Rising Powers research 
programme. She has also been active in the 
RPID ‘Learning from the Rising Powers’ 
Development Experiences’ component, focusing 
on policy engagement, and mutual learning in 
health and social policy, in and between the 
BRICS and other countries. 
  
Her research focuses on triangular and South-
South Cooperation, and the ‘export’ of social 
policy from Brazil to sub-Saharan Africa. Other 
interests include the aid/development 
effectiveness debate; health and social policy 
reform; and communication for development.  
 
Jennifer read Portuguese and Brazilian Studies at 
King’s College London, and has an MA in 
Development Studies from IDS. Jennifer 
previously worked for the IDS BRICS Initiative, 
the European Commission, and the World Food 
Programme.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stacey Townsend is the Administrator for  
the IDS Rising Powers research programme  
and has worked in the Globalisation Team  
at IDS for four years. 
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Musab Younis 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
Fran Seballos 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
 
 
 
Musab Younis is a Research Officer at the 
Institute of Development Studies with special 
responsibility for the Rising Powers in 
International Development (RPID) programme.  
 
He is collating and organising material on the 
BRICS as development actors and conducting 
research with Noshua Watson and Stephen 
Spratt on the BRICS Bank. He is also the lead 
author of a new annotated bibliography on the 
rising powers published by IDS, and the editor of 
the Rising Powers Eldis resource page. 
 
Musab has an MPhil degree in International 
Relations from the University of Oxford. His own 
research focuses on the concept of the ‘South’ in 
international relations, pan-Africanism, anti-
colonial movements and postcolonial theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fran is a Research Officer at the Institute of 
Development Studies specialising in climate 
change adaptation work. With 15 years of 
experience working in the field of climate change 
adaptation, environmental action and community 
engagement, Fran’s interests lie at the interface 
between human development and natural 
resource management. 
 
Her particular interests are around the impact of 
climate and disasters on social and ecological 
systems, the role of decentralised governance 
and participatory decision-making and 
understanding processes that influence change. 
 
Fran currently works across a range of thematic 
areas including the Rising Powers programme, 
providing capacity support to partnering and 
learning processes with a view to ‘linking different 
perspectives’ and ‘improving influence and 
impact’ of research within the IDS programme on 
Strengthening Evidence-based Policy. 
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Kaustuv Bandyopadhyay 
Society for Participatory Research in Asia 
(PRIA) 
Rajesh Tandon 
Society for Participatory Research in Asia 
(PRIA) 
 
 
 
Kaustuv Bandyopadhyay is Director of Global 
Partnerships at PRIA and a member of the 
Strategic Management Board of PRIA. His current 
responsibilities include strategic planning, 
programme development, networking and 
partnership building, and resource mobilisation. 
 
He provides research, consultancy and training 
services in the areas of democratic governance, 
citizenship and civil society building (including 
organisation development, strategic planning, 
participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation) 
and social accountability. 
 
From 1998–2008, he was the Head of the Urban 
Governance Programme at PRIA, working on 
research, training and programme development in 
the areas of citizen participation, social 
accountability and participatory urban 
governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Rajesh Tandon is an internationally acclaimed 
leader and practitioner of participatory research 
and development. He founded the Society for 
Participatory Research in Asia in 1982, a 
voluntary organisation providing support to grass 
roots initiatives in South Asia. Dr Tandon 
specialises in social and organisational change, 
focusing on participatory research, advocating for 
people-centred development, policy reform and 
networking in India, South Asia and beyond.  
Dr Tandon has championed the cause of building 
organisations and capacities of the marginalised 
through their knowledge, learning and 
empowerment.  
 
He has contributed to the emergence of several 
local, national and international groups and 
initiatives to promote authentic and participatory 
development of societies. Dr Tandon has 
authored over 100 articles, a dozen books and 
numerous training manuals on democratic 
governance, civic engagement, CSOs, NGO 
governance and management, participatory 
research and people-centred development. He 
has served in an advisory capacity on numerous 
expert groups of several ministries of central and 
state governments and the Planning Commission 
India, and served as Advisor to the 
Commonwealth Foundation, UNDP, and 
numerous other international agencies.  
 
For his distinguished work on gender issues, the 
Government of India honoured Dr Tandon with 
the Prestigious Award in Social Justice in 2007.  
The Victoria University, Canada, awarded  
Dr Tandon the degree of ‘Doctor of Laws (Honoris 
Causa) in recognition of his pioneering work in 
civic engagement, governance and community 
based research (2008).  
 
Dr Tandon has a PhD from U. Case Western 
Reserve, and degrees in electronic engineering 
(IIT) Kanpur and management (IIM Calcutta).  
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Julia Mello Neiva 
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Silvio Caccia Bava is a Sociologist, Researcher at 
the Instituto Polis, Director and Editor-in-Chief of 
Le Monde Diplomatique Brazil. He coordinates 
the global network LogoLink , the Learning 
Initiative on Citizen Participation and Local 
Governance. 
 
He was President of the Brazilian Association of 
NGOs – ABONG – for two terms and President of 
the Latin American Association of Organizations 
for the Promotion of Development (ALOP). He 
was also a member of the Brazilian National 
Council for Food and Nutritional Security 
(CONSEA), Vice President of the Human Rights 
State Council in the State of Sao Paulo, Brazil; 
and Latin America Director for the Habitat 
International Coalition.  
 
He has published extensively on topics such as 
social movements, citizen participation, local 
development, the systemic crisis and new 
paradigms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Julia Mello Neiva graduated from Pontifícia 
Universidade Católica de São Paulo. She 
specialised in Human Rights at the Faculty of 
Law, University of São Paulo, and has a Masters 
(LL.M) and was Human Rights Fellow at the Law 
School of Columbia University, New York.  
 
She is the International Coordinator of the Global 
Network LogoLink (Learning Initiative on Citizen 
Participation and Local Governance). Lawyer in 
São Paulo. 
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Ming Zhuang 
China Centre for Participatory Research 
Nigel Martin 
FIM Forum 
 
 
 
Based in Chengdu, Ming Zhuang specialises in 
civic engagement, social equality, and poverty 
alleviation. He has worked in China for over ten 
years in partnership with central and local 
government, NGOs, and international 
organisations and groups including the World 
Bank, United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), United Nations 
Human Settlements Programme (UN–Habitat), 
Department for International Development 
(DFID), Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Oxfam, ActionAid, 
World Vision, Mercy Corps and others. 
 
Ming is the Founder and Director of the Social 
Accountability Knowledge Center in China. He is 
engaged in both research and action on concerns 
related to civil society, citizen participation, local 
governance, accountability, and transparency. 
 
With a focus on domestic rural migrants and rural 
community development in China, Ming has 
published papers on civil society development, 
citizen participation, poverty alleviation, and social 
inequality. 
 
Ming has a Master’s degree in sociology, and is a 
China Fellowship Program PhD candidate of 
Public Policy at Beijing Normal University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nigel Martin is the founding President and CEO of 
FIM and currently a Senior Advisor. A graduate of 
Mount Allison University, Nigel has over 35 years 
of experience in the NGO community in Canada 
and elsewhere and has served as executive 
director of several organisations, including the 
Canadian Council for International Cooperation in 
Ottawa (Canada), Euro Action Accord in London 
(UK), as well as the Organisation Canadienne 
pour la Solidarité et le Développement and 
Oxfam-Québec in Montreal (Canada).  
 
Nigel began his career with the Canadian 
International Development Agency in 1971, where 
he was one of the earliest staff members of the 
then-fledgling NGO programme before eventually 
pursuing a career in the sector. He is a member 
of the steering committee of the United Nations 
Development Programme Platform HD2010 and 
has been an official advisor on development 
issues to both the Government of Canada and the 
Government of Quebec.  
 
Nigel’s publications include Practice-Research 
Engagement and Civil Society (co-author, 2001) 
and Critical Mass: The Emergence of Global Civil 
Society (co-author, 2008). He also wrote the 
foreword to Democratizing Global Governance: 
Ten Years of Case Studies and Reflections by 
Civil Society Activists (2009). Nigel has served on 
several boards of directors and is currently on the 
Carold Foundation Board in Toronto. He is also a 
co-founder of Mothers’ Call International. 
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Anshuman Karol 
Society for Participatory Research in Asia 
(PRIA) 
Laura Trajber Waisbich 
Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning 
(CEBRAP) 
 
 
 
Anshuman Karol is Assistant Policy Manager at 
PRIA, based in New Delhi, where he is 
responsible for providing support to different 
states in India on decentralised district planning 
through The Asia Foundation, UNDP, Unicef 
sponsored programmes. Prior joining PRIA, he 
worked with Central Potato Research Institute 
(CPRI), Agro-Economic Research Centre (AERC) 
and Institute of Integrated Himalayan Studies 
(IIHS) in Shimla, Himachal Pradesh.  
 
He has more than 11 years of experience in the 
development sector especially in research, 
programme evaluation, policy analysis, advocacy, 
capacity-building and community mobilisation in 
India. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laura Trajber Waisbich is Brazilian; she 
graduated in International Relations at Pontifícia 
Universidade de São Paulo (PUC-SP) in Brazil 
and has a Master’s in International Relations and 
Political Sciences from the Institut d’Etudes 
Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) in France.  
 
Since 2011, she is has been an Assistant 
Researcher at CEBRAP and Editorial Assistant at 
Sur – International Journal on Human Rights, 
published by Conectas Human Rights. At 
CEBRAP she is a member of the Citizenship and 
Development Group (NCD) where she integrates 
current research projects on Public Health in 
Brazil and assists the building of a South-South 
collaboration network: CORD (Collaboration for 
Research on Democracy). 
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Arilson da Silva Favareto 
Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning 
(CEBRAP) 
Paulo Esteves 
BRICS Policy Center (Brazil) 
 
 
 
 
Arilson da Silva Favareto is a sociologist and 
Associate Researcher at CEBRAP. He holds a 
Bachelor’s degree of Social Sciences from the 
Catholic University of Campinas, an MA in 
Sociology from the State University of Campinas, 
and a PhD in Environmental Science from the 
University of São Paulo. Part of his studies were 
also conducted at the École des Hautes Études 
en Sciences Sociales in Paris.  
 
He is currently Adjunct Professor at the Federal 
University of ABC, which is linked to the Centre 
for Engineering, Modeling and Applied Social 
Sciences, the Interdisciplinary Program of 
Graduate Studies in Energy and the Masters 
Program in Planning and Territory Management.  
 
His topics of current research at CEBRAP involve 
theoretical and applied economic sociology. His 
previous experience includes research and 
consultancy undertaken for government agencies, 
social movements and international cooperation 
agencies. He is the author of the book Paradigms 
of Relevant Rural Development, which was 
awarded best doctoral thesis by the National 
Association of Graduate Studies and Research in 
Urban and Regional Planning (V Award Policy 
and Regional Planning). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paulo Luiz Moreaux Lavigne Esteves holds a 
degree in History from the Universidade Federal 
de Minas Gerais (1993), and an MSc (1995) and 
PhD (2003) in Political Science at Instituto 
Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro 
(IUPERJ). He is Professor of International 
Relations at the Catholic University of Rio de 
Janeiro and was the editor of the books 
Instituições Internacionais: Segurança, Comércio 
e Integração (2004) and Relações Internacionais: 
Debates Teóricos e Metateóricos (2010).  
 
He has experience as a consultant to the United 
Nations Development Program, the Government 
of the State of Minas Gerais, CNPq (Brazil’s 
National Council of Technological and Scientific 
Development, linked to the Ministry of Science 
and Technology) and CAPES (Higher Education 
Co-ordination Agency, linked to the Ministry of 
Education). He was a founding member of the 
Association of International Relations, of which he 
was Director from 2005 to 2009, and is an elected 
member of the executive committee International 
Political Sociology, a branch of the International 
Studies Association.  
 
He is currently conducting research on the 
convergence of the fields of international security, 
humanitarian assistance and development and on 
the participation of Brazil, middle powers, and 
peripheral countries in the new international 
security architecture. 
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Melissa Pomeroy earned her undergraduate 
degree in International Relations, by the Pontifícia 
Universidade Católica de São Paulo; holds a 
certificate in Participation and Sustainable 
Development and an MSc on Political Science, by 
the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. 
Currently, Melissa is working on her PhD 
dissertation at the same university. She has over 
ten years’ experience on citizen participation 
practices, public policy and international 
cooperation as a researcher, consultant, trainer 
and project manager. Experience includes work in 
multicultural environments, with local and national 
government, civil society, international institutions 
and academia.  
 
Previous employers include Barcelona and São 
Paulo municipal governments, International 
Observatory of Participatory Democracy – OIDP, 
Catalunya regional government, Paraguay 
national government, Government and Public 
Policies Institute – IGOP, Brazilian NGOs).   
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Anuradha Joshi 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
Deepta Chopra 
Institute of Development Studies (IDS) 
 
 
 
Dr Anuradha Joshi is a social scientist with a 
focus on policy processes and extensive 
experience in institutional analysis of 
development. She has worked on issues related 
to poverty, low-income housing, public services 
and environmental policy. Her current research 
interests focus on collective action, social 
accountability and service delivery – mobilising 
‘demand’ in basic services and in the scaling-up 
of innovative service delivery approaches.  
 
She is also interested in taxation of the informal 
sector. She has experience of consulting for 
bilateral and multilateral agencies in development 
and managing large, multi-country research 
projects and has travelled and researched in 
India, Indonesia, Nepal, Vietnam and Ghana. Her 
thematic expertise focuses on governance; 
collective action; public policy; politics and power; 
rights; taxation. 
 
Recent projects include the Academic Partnership 
in Support of Teaching Development Aid 
Curriculum in Russia; and recent publications and 
co-authored articles include: Do they Work? 
Assessing the Impact of Transparency and 
Accountability Initiatives (2012); Widgets or 
Watchdogs? Conceptual Explorations in Social 
Accountability (2012); ‘Políticas Sociais: 
comparações entre Brasil e India’ in Direito e 
Desenvolvimento, um Diálogo Entre os Brics 
(2012); Making Basic Education Free (2011); and 
many others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Deepta Chopra is a social policy researcher 
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